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Abstract
A range of political and social developments in the Netherlands suggest that ethnic 
profiling in political and social discourse is no longer seen as a taboo. Increasingly 
ethnic profiling is  perceived as part of the solution to ‘the problem’ of terrorism, 
radicalisation,  integration, violent crime,  serious public nuisance or public safety.  
Although Dutch legislation and regulations do not explicitly prohibit ethnic or racial 
profiling,  for law enforcement  officials to use generalisations based on ethnicity, 
race,  national  origin  or  religion is  at  odds  with  national  and  international  law. 
Nonetheless, there is a risk that  police, security,  immigration and customs officials 
exercise  their  general  and  special  powers  on  the  basis  of  generalisations  or 
stereotypes to tackle pressing social needs.
Within the Dutch political arena and in public speech, ethnic profiling is increasingly perceived as part  
of the solution to ‘the problem’ of terrorism, radicalisation, integration, violent crime, serious public 
nuisance  or  public  safety.  The  over-representation  of  non-Western  ethnic  minorities  in  registered 
crime  statistics,  for  example,  influences  extreme  political  statements  including  the  calls  for  the 
‘deportation of convicted criminals  with Moroccan nationality’  and ‘special  stop and searches for 
Antillean  youths  in  Rotterdam’.2 Public  policies  targeted  at  minorities  are  not  always  necessary, 
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proportionate or effective. Since 9/11 counter-terrorism and deradicalisation policies have focused on 
Islamic  youths  yet  their  effect  is  not  clear.3 Furthermore,  as  the  supposed  relationship  between 
ethnicity and social  problems  has  become  a  political  issue,  law enforcement  is  under  pressure  to 
profile on the basis of race, origin, nationality, religion, or residential status. The police, for instance,  
have been involved in the ‘stop and check’ of the identity of specific groups of aliens, such as West  
Africans, as well as extra alcohol controls for foreign drivers, especially from Poland.4 Even though 
studies  suggest  that  the  polarised political  and  public  debate  discourse  does  not reflect  reality, 
minorities, such as the Muslim population, increasingly do feel discriminated against. 5 Consequently, 
one wonders how these political developments relate to the Dutch legal framework. Does the political  
and public discourse on ethnic profiling affect legislation and regulations? How do law enforcement  
agencies respond?
Since Dutch legislation and regulations do not explicitly prohibit ethnic or racial profiling, this article 
refers  mainly  to  national  and  international  standards  governing  the  principles  of  equality,  non-
discrimination,  privacy,  and  the  protection  of  personal  data.  Ethnic  or  racial  profiling  is  often 
discussed in relation to the prohibition of discrimination, but it can also be viewed in the context of the 
protection of privacy and personal data. Furthermore, the relevant legislation and regulations will be  
reviewed, followed by a brief overview of the structure of the Dutch police, security, immigration and 
customs services. The tasks and powers of the diverse investigating officers and supervisory officials 
will  be examined,  with special  attention to  investigative and law enforcement  powers  in  which a  
certain risk of ethnic profiling is inherent. Such powers include the authority to stop people and check 
their identity papers, as well as security searches, arrests and access to personal data. The discussion  
will  also  look  at  special  administrative  measures,  compulsory  identification,  the  instrument  of 
preventive searches, the ban on public assembly that may be imposed in certain circumstances, and the 
use of (and linkage of) digital databases containing personal details. Finally, the article concludes that 
in  the  Netherlands,  due  to  political  and  social  developments  including  terrorism,  radicalisation, 
integration, violent crime, serious public nuisance and public safety, the genie has been let out of the 
bottle and that ethnic profiling in political and social discourse is no longer considered a taboo. 
Ethnic profiling 
A recent non-binding resolution of the European Parliament addressed the problem of ethnic profiling 
and emphasised that all processing of personal data for law enforcement and anti-terrorist purposes 
should be based on published legal rules. The resolution underscored the need to establish a clear  
definition of legitimate versus illegal uses of sensitive personal data in the security field. 6 However 
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ontleed’(‘Decrease and Withdrawl: Reviewing processen of deradicalisation’), IMES: Amsterdam.
4 National Police Services Agency (KLPD) (2010), ‘Gerichte Alcohol Controles’ (‘Targeted alcohol controles’), 
20 Augustus 2010, Police website (accessed 31 August 2010); National Ombudsman (2009). ‘Onderzoek inval 
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5 H Moors, L  Balogh,  J van  Donselaar and B de Graaff  (2009),  Monitor: Polarisatie en Radicalisering in  
Nederland: Een verkenning van de stand van zaken in 2009 (‘Monitor: Polarisation and Radicalisation in the 
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there is as yet no consensus, either in the Netherlands or elsewhere, as to precisely what constitutes  
‘ethnic  profiling’  although  a  number  of  authoritative  definitions  exist.7 Under  international  law, 
ethnicity  is  regarded  as  a  subcategory  of  race  (Article  1,  UN  International  Convention  on  the 
Elimination of All  Forms of Racial Discrimination: ‘UN Race Convention’).  In practice,  however 
what constitutes ethnicity is often inferred by officials from self-definition or on the basis of diverse  
features such as nationality, religion, culture, language and country of origin of the person in question 
or parents.8 According to the Open Society Institute, ethnic profiling is ‘the use by the police, security, 
immigration or customs officials of generalisations based on race, ethnicity, religion or national origin 
− rather  than individual  behaviour  or objective evidence − as  the  basis for suspicion in directing 
discretionary law enforcement actions. It can also include situations where law enforcement policies 
and practices, although not themselves defined either wholly or in part by reference to ethnicity, race,  
national origin or religion, nevertheless do have a disproportionate impact on such groups within the 
population  and  where  this  cannot  otherwise  be  justified  in  terms  of  legitimate  law  enforcement 
objectives and outcomes.’9
Drawing up profiles  is  in  itself  a  legitimate  instrument and is  a  means  frequently deployed with 
success  by police,  security,  immigration and customs  officials,  for  instance in  maintaining  public  
order,  performing  border  controls,  or  preventing  or  investigating  criminal  offences.  The  question 
arises, however, as to whether the use of such instruments can pass specific scrutiny tests for there is a  
risk that certain people and groups may be stigmatised and consequently feel alienated from society. 10 
The Government is guilty of discrimination if the profiles are based on personal characteristics such as 
ethnicity, race, origin, language, culture and/or religion. This is in breach of international human rights  
and fundamental rights. 
Reality or perception? Ethnic profiling in the Netherlands
Although little  research has  been done on profiling by law enforcement  officials  on the basis  of 
ethnicity,  religion,  nationality  or  residence  status  in  the  Netherlands,11 diverse  actors  within  civil 
society suspect that it takes place. From a recent survey of perceptions of ethnic minorities within the  
European Union,12 it appeared, for instance, that 25% of Dutch Muslims of Turkish origin interviewed 
LIBE/6/58595.
7 ENAR (2009) Factsheet 40: ‘Ethnic Profiling’, Brussels: European Network Against Racism, p 3; JA  Goldston 
(2005), ‘Toward a Europe without Ethnic Profiling’, Justice Initiative, June 2005, p 7.
8 A Terlouw (2009), ‘Etnische Registratie van Risicojongeren en het Verbod op Rassendiscriminatie’ (‘Ethnic  
registration of high-risk youth and the prohibition of racial discrimination’), NJCM Bulletin, Year 34, vol. 4 pp 
608-622, at 610.
9 OSI (2009),  Defining Ethnic Profiling, New York: Open Society Institute, 7 October 2009, p 2. 
10 F Bovenkerk (2009), Wie is de Terrorist: Zin en onzin van ethnic profiling (‘Who is the Terrorist? Sense and 
nonsense of ethnic profiling’), Rotterdam: Ger Guijs, pp 45-46. 
11 F  Bovenkerk  and  M  San  (1999),  ‘De  politie  en  de  multiculturele  samenleving’  (‘The  police  and  the  
multicultural  society’),  in  F Bovenkerk,  M van San and S de Vries  (eds),  Politiewerk  in  de Multiculturele  
Samenleving,  Apeldoorn: LSOP, pp. 3-78; B  Rovers.  (1999),  ‘Dertig Jaar Onderzoek naar Klassenjustitie in 
Nederland: Wat zijn de resultaten en hoe nu verder?’ (‘Thirty years of research on class-based administration of 
justice in the Netherlands: The findings and the way forward’). Paper presented at the conference of the Dutch 
Association  of  Criminologists  (NVK)  ‘Vooruitzichten  in  de  criminologie’  (‘Prospects  in  criminology’), 
Amsterdam, 17 June 1999; F Bovenkerk (1978),  Omdat Ze Anders Zijn: Patronen van rassendiscriminatie in  
Nederland (‘Because they are different: Patterns of racial discrimination in the Netherlands’), Amsterdam: Boom 
Publishers. 
12 For the study in the Netherlands, 1.375 respondents were interviewed, mostly of Turkish, North African and 
Surinamese origin. These interviews took place in Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht. The non-
response rate was 23%. For more information, see EU Fundamental Rights Agency (2009),  European Union 
Minorities and Discrimination Survey  (EU-MIDIS), EU Fundamental Rights Agency, 18 June 2009, pp 8/ 34-
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had been stopped by the police at least once in the 12 months prior to the survey, and that of these  
individuals, 25% had the impression that this was based on ethnicity. The corresponding figures for 
Dutch Muslims of North African origin were 26% and 39%, respectively.13 The National Ombudsman 
receives frequent complaints about discrimination by immigration officials at Schiphol airport14 and 
international human rights bodies are beginning to take notice. The United Nations Human Rights 
Committee is one of the bodies to have put questions to the Netherlands on ethnic profiling in its  
review of Dutch policy.15  
Dutch legislation and regulations
There is no explicit prohibition of ethnic profiling in Dutch legislation or regulations, but since it is a 
form of  direct  discrimination,  diverse  statutory provisions  will  be  discussed  here.  Discrimination 
between  individuals  on  the  basis  of  race,  ethnicity,  religion,  sex,  nationality,  language  etc   is 
prohibited by international conventions that are directly applicable in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
16 as well as by the Dutch Constitution,  the Equal  Treatment  Act,  and a number  of provisions of 
criminal and administrative law. Some of these statutory provisions relate to institutional policy and  
the actions of police, security, immigration and customs officials.
 
The  right  to  equal  treatment  and the  ban  on  discrimination  are  fundamental  rights,  and  they are 
therefore both included in the first article of the Dutch Constitution. This states as follows: 
All persons in the Netherlands shall be treated equally in equal circumstances. 
Discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, race or sex 
or on any other grounds whatsoever shall not be permitted.17
Like Article  26 of  the  United Nations  (UN) International  Covenant  on Civil  and Political  Rights  
(ICCPR), Article 1 of the Dutch Constitution enshrines both a principle of universal equality and a ban 
on discrimination.18 The principle of equality means that everyone must be treated equally in equal  
circumstances and that even though opinion may be divided on this point, there is no justification for 
35/80-82.
13 In total, 25% of the Muslims interviewed in the European Union had been stopped by the police at least once 
in the 12 months prior to the survey. Of these, 40% had the impression that ethnic profiling was involved. For 
the report dealing specifically with Muslims, see European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2009), ‘Data 
in  Focus  Report:  Muslims’,  in  EU  Fundamental  Rights  Agency  (2009),  European  Union  Minorities  and  
Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS), No 2, 28 May 2009, pp 13-14.
14 CBG (2009),  Comments  on the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Dutch Reports  on the Implementation of  the  
Convention  on  the  Elimination  of  All  Form of  Racial  Discrimination,  Equal  Treatment  Commission  /  The 
Ombudsman / Data Protection Authority, March 2009, pp 17-18.
15 United Nations Human Rights  Committee  (2008),  List  of  Issues  to be Taken up in  Connection with the  
Consideration  of  the  Fourth  Periodic  Report  of  the  Netherlands (CCPR/C/NET/4;  CCPR/C/NET/4/Add.1; 
CCPR/C/NET/4/Add.2) CCPR/C/NLD/Q/4, 25 November 2008, para 2, p 4; Council of Europe (2009), Report 
by the Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas Hammerberg, on his visit to the Netherlands, CommDH (2009) 
2, 11 March 2009.
16 The  Netherlands  adheres  to  a  monistic  system  in  which  international  conventions  and  the  decisions  of  
organisations  established  under  international  law are  self-executing  and  do  not  have  to  be  transposed  into 
national legislation. See articles 93 and 94, Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 12 September 1840 
(Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 1840, 54).
17 Article 1, Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 12 September 1840 (Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 
1840, 54).
18 Other relevant articles of the ICCPR are Articles 2, 9 and 14.
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making distinctions, even if this is done on reasonable and objective grounds. 19 The Netherlands is 
also party to almost all UN human rights conventions, including the UN Race Convention.
In addition, as a state party and member of the European Union (EU) and the Council of Europe, the 
Netherlands has an obligation to adhere to international conventions and EU legislation: regulations, 
directives, and decisions. The most important of these are the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), especially Article 14,20 the Twelfth Protocol to 
the ECHR,21 the EU Race Directive, especially Article 2, and the EU Anti-Discrimination Directive, 22 
the Privacy Directives,23 the Lisbon Treaty, and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.24 Where the 
ECHR is concerned, it should be noted that Article 14 provides protection from discrimination only in 
combination with one of the other rights, such as the right to liberty and security of person (Article 5 
ECHR). This situation was remedied by the ratification of the Twelfth Protocol to the ECHR in 2005,  
since this Protocol provides for the general prohibition of discrimination in all  de facto and  de jure 
acts by the government (that is, including acts by law enforcement officials). It should also be added  
that the EU Race Directive, which seeks to curb discrimination on the basis of race or ethnic origin,  
deals solely with equal treatment in the supply of goods and services. Under the terms of Article 3, 
paragraph 2 of the EU Race Directive, the prohibition does not include difference of treatment based 
on nationality, and non-EU residents cannot derive any rights from it.25 
19 Senate / House of Representatives of the States General, Ratification of Protocol 12 to the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted in Rome on 4 November 2000 (Dutch Treaties  
Series  2001, 18 and 173);  Recommendations and additional  report,  Parliamentary Papers  2001-2002, 28100 
(R1705), no. 129a/A, 5 November 2000.
20 For more information, read Senate / House of Representatives of the States General, Ratification of Protocol 
12 to the  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted in Rome on 4 
November  2000  (Dutch  Treaties  Series  2001,  18  and  173);  Recommendations  and  additional  report, 
Parliamentary Papers 2001-2002, 28100 (R1705), no. 129a/A, 5 November 2000.
21 Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Twelfth Protocol to the ECHR prohibits discrimination by any public authority.  
The Netherlands ratified this Protocol on 1 April 2005 (Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2004, 302).)
22 The EU Equal Treatment Directive (2008) on the Equal Treatment of Persons Irrespective of Religion or 
Belief,  Disability,  Age  or  Sexual  Orientation,  no  COM(2008)0426-C6-0291/2008-2008/0140  (CNS) 
supplements earlier directives, including the EU Race Directive (2000),  Implementing the Principle of Equal 
Treatment between Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin, no 2000/43/EC, 29 June 2000. At the same 
time, Article 10 of the Lisbon Treaty states that ‘in defining and implementing its policies and activities, the 
Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age 
or sexual orientation’.  For more information, see J Goldston (2003),  ‘The European Union Race Directive’,  
Moscow Workshop, 27-29 January 2003, New York: Open Society Institute.
23 Data Protection Directive (1995), On the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data and on the Free Movement of such Data, no 1995/46/ EC, and the EU Directive on Privacy and Electronic  
Communication  (2002),  Concerning  the  Processing  of  Personal  Data  and  the  Protection  of  Privacy  in  the 
Electronic  Communications  Sector,  no  2002/58/EU,  12  July  2002.  On  28  January  2010,  EU  Justice 
Commissioner  Reding  announced  that  she  would  be  proposing  amendments  to  modernise  the  EU  privacy 
regulations on the basis of the Data Protection Directive and the specific rules applicable to telecommunication 
and the internet (e-Privacy rules).
24 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (7 December 2000, amended 12 December 2007 
Strasbourg) is not part of the Lisbon Treaty (2007/C306/01), which modernised and reformed the Treaty on  
European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, but EU institutions and national states  
that implement EU legislation are obliged to observe these fundamental rights and the principle of subsidiarity  
applies to the obligations of the member states. 
25 Even in the Lisbon Treaty, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of nationality, this prohibition applies  
only to EU citizens (Article 18, Lisbon Treaty). In addition, the Council of the EU ‘may take appropriate action 
to  combat  discrimination  based  on  sex,  racial  or  ethnic  origin,  religion  or  belief,  disability,  age  or  sexual  
orientation’, but not based on nationality (Article 19, Lisbon Treaty).
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Views differ when it comes to the absolute protection of fundamental rights such as the principle of 
equality and the prohibition of discrimination in relation to ethnic profiling. Still, there is a consensus 
that  it  is  legitimate  to  draw  distinctions  on  the  basis  of  specific  scrutiny  tests,  including 
proportionality, effectiveness and necessity.26 This is clear from the case law of the European Court of 
Human  Rights  and  the  Data  Protection  Convention  of  the  Council  of  Europe.27 In  addition, 
Goldschmidt  and  Rodriques  maintain,  in  an  article  on  the  use  of  ethnic  and religious profiles  in  
antiterrorism activities, that whenever there is a breach of fundamental rights, it is always essential to  
determine whether these breaches are proportional and necessary.28 Thus, investigating officers must 
ask themselves  whether  the  advantages  of  profiling  outweigh the disadvantages,  and  whether  the 
objective cannot be attained in some less extreme way.
 
Since it is widely held by jurists that Article 1 of the Dutch Constitution prohibits discrimination in a 
vertical  sense  −  that  is,  between  the  state  and  its  inhabitants  −  supplementary  equal  treatment  
legislation exists,  which is  applicable in a horizontal  sense,  among members  of the public.  Equal  
treatment legislation in the Netherlands derives from a variety of international conventions and from 
article 1 of the Dutch Constitution. The Equal Treatment Act (AWGB) prohibits discrimination on the 
basis  of  religion  and belief,  political  opinions,  race,  sex,  nationality,  heterosexual  or  homosexual  
orientation,  or  marital  status.  This  Act  distinguishes  between  direct  and  indirect  forms  of 
discrimination, whereby some forms of indirect discrimination may be justified on objective or legal 
grounds (section 2, AWGB). The Act applies to public life and not to churches or other communities  
based on spiritual values. Complaints may be submitted to the Equal Treatment Commission, whose 
conclusions are authoritative but not binding.
In consonance with the UN Race Convention, discrimination is a criminal offence in the Netherlands. 
Article 90 quater of the Criminal Code gives the following definition: 
Discrimination shall be defined as any form of distinction, any exclusion, restriction 
or preference,  the purpose or effect  of  which is  to nullify or infringe upon the 
recognition,  enjoyment  or  exercise  on  an  equal  footing  of  human  rights  and 
fundamental freedoms in the political,  economic, social or cultural fields or any 
other field of public life.
 
26 Senate / House of Representatives of the States General, Wijziging van de Wet op de jeugdzorg in verband met  
de  introductie  van  een  verwijsindex  om vroegtijdige  en  onderling  afgestemde  verlening  van  hulp,  zorg  of  
bijsturing ten behoeve van jeugdigen die bepaalde risico's lopen te bevorderen (verwijsindex risico's jeugdigen);  
Advies en nader rapport,  (‘Amendment of the Youth Care Act, introducing a reference index to promote the 
timely  and  coordinated  provision  of  assistance,  care  or  guidance  for  certain  at-risk  young  people;  
Recommendations and additional report’); Parliamentary Papers 2008-2009, 31855, no 4, 12 February 2009, p 
12/13; ENAR (2009) ‘Factsheet 40: Ethnic Profiling’, Brussels: European Network Against Racism (ENAR), p 
5; ECRI (2007).  General Policy Recommendation no 11 On Combating Racism and Racial Discrimination in  
Policing, European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), CRI / Council of Europe no 2007/39, 
29 June 2007, p 9.
27 European Court of Human Rights, Timishev v Russia, Application nos 55762/00, 55974/00, Judgment of 13 
December 2005, sections 56-58; Council of Europe (1981), Data Protection Convention, 28 January 1981.
28 JE  Goldschmidt  and  PR  Rodriques  (2006),  ‘Het  Gebruik  van  Etnische  en  Religieuze  Profielen  bij  het 
Voorkomen  en  Opsporen  van  Strafbare  Feiten  die  een  Bedreiging  Vormen  voor  de  Openbare  Orde  en 
Veiligheid’  (‘The Use of Ethnic and Religious Profiles in Preventing and Investigating Criminal Offences that 
pose a Threat to Public Order and Security’), pp 40-60. In J van Donselaar and PR Rodrigues (2006) (eds), 
Monitor  Racisme  &  Extremisme:  Zevende  rapportage,   Amsterdam  /  Leiden:  Anne  Frank  Foundation  / 
University of Leiden, p 40.
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In addition, specific forms of discrimination are regarded as criminal  offences in the Netherlands.  
Aside from offences with a discriminatory element, such as intimidation, incitement, dissemination, 
and support in relation to activities geared towards discrimination, discrimination in the exercise of  
public office and in one’s occupation or business activities is also a criminal  offence (see articles  
137c-f and 429s quater, Criminal Code). 
There is also a Police Code of Conduct: the General Discrimination Directive 2007,29 which relates to 
passing  on  information,  pre-investigation,  investigation  and  prosecution  of  those  charged  with 
discrimination. Special public prosecutors attached to eleven regional public prosecutor’s offices and 
liaison officers in the police service are responsible for bringing offenders to justice.30 The basic point 
of departure is that the police are obliged to send official reports to the Public Prosecution Service.
The  Dutch  public  authorities  are  obliged  to  adhere  to  the  above-mentioned  prohibitions  on 
discrimination and the principle of equality. According to the definition used by the Ombudsman, 31 
these  are  requirements  of  good  governance  (based  on  fundamental  rights  and  substantive  good 
governance), which must be observed by municipal authorities and other administrative authorities.32 
Administrative  courts  are  involved  in  maintaining  public  order,  supervisory  officials  monitor 
compliance with regulations under administrative law, and administrative bodies impose sanctions; all  
these activities may unintentionally foster ethnic profiling (see the section on special powers below).33 
In a general sense, administrative courts rule on the basis of the General Administrative Law Act. In  
addition, there is legislation governing specific areas of administrative law, such as the Aliens Act  
2000. Neither the Aliens Act nor the Aliens Act Implementation Guidelines 2000 refers explicitly to 
the  prohibition  of  discrimination.  However,  the  Aliens  Act  does  include  a  guarantee  of  non-
discrimination in the control of aliens. Aliens services are under an obligation to perform ‘stop and  
check’  activities  in  a  non-discriminatory  way.  Law  enforcement  officials  responsible  for  border 
controls and aliens control are not permitted to stop someone unless there is good reason to suspect, on  
the basis of objective facts and circumstances, that the person is an illegal resident (section 50, Aliens  
Act). Even so, the evaluation of the Aliens Act 2000 revealed inconsistencies in practice. 34 In 2004, for 
instance,  it  was  shown  that  many  police  officers  (including  those  who  serve  as  assistant  public  
prosecutors)  are  insufficiently  well  informed  regarding  this  criterion.  It  should  be  added  that  a 
residence permit may be denied or revoked if the alien concerned is regarded as posing a threat to 
national security or public order (section 14, Aliens Act /  chapter 4.4, Aliens Act Implementation  
Guidelines 2000). Specific grounds must be present for this conclusion. 
Besides focusing on the prohibition of discrimination, one can also approach this issue in relation to 
the fundamental right of privacy and the protection of personal data. One reason why this approach too 
merits  attention  is  that  information-gathering  and ‘data-mining’,  that  is,  gathering  information  or  
29 Board of Procurators-General, General Discrimination Directive, no 2007A010, 12 October 2009. 
30 They are supported by two national expertise centres: the National Discrimination Expertise Centre (LECD 
Public Prosecution Service) and the National Diversity Expertise Centre (LECD Police).
31 The  National  Ombudsman  examines  the  government’s  actions  for  adherence  to  the  principles  of  good 
governance. 
32 National  Ombudsman  (2009),  De  Behoorlijkheidswijzer  (‘Indicators  for  good  governance’),  The  Hague: 
National Ombudsman. 
33 FAM Michiels (2006),  Houdbaar Handhavingsrecht (‘Sustainable Enforcement  Law’)  (inaugural  address, 
University of Tilburg), Deventer: Kluwer, p141.
34 PFM Boekhoorn (2004),  Evaluatie Operationeel Toezicht Vreemdelingendiensten: Vreemdelingenwet 2000, 
(‘Evaluation  of  the  Operational  Control  of  Aliens;  Aliens Act  2000’),  Research  and  Documentation Centre 
(WODC), The Hague: Boom Publishers. This evaluation is part of the advisory report issued by the Aliens Act  
2000 Evaluation Committee.
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searching digital databases on the basis of profiles in order to store, structure, link and/or summarise 
conclusions, plays an ever greater role in society. Databases are rapidly proliferating at national and 
European  level.  These  include  European  databases  for  security  and  immigration  policy  such  as 
Eurodac  (fingerprints  for  the  identification  of  asylum seekers),  the  ECRIS  system (enabling  EU 
countries to access each other’s national criminal records databases) and the Schengen Information 
System (with data on aliens who have been declared ‘undesirable’), which is primarily intended for  
tracking  down suspects  and  convicted  criminals  but  is  also  used  to  restrict  immigration.35 In  the 
Netherlands, digital personal data are stored on a large scale. The average Dutch national is registered 
in some 250 to 500 databases, and since data are regularly linked, it is sometimes impossible to say 
where personal details have been retained and why.36 In addition, there is still a substantial margin of 
error, not to mention the risk of identity fraud.37 
The prohibition of ethnic profiling in relation to information-gathering and data-mining is enforced on 
the basis of the fundamental right of privacy and in particular the protection of personal data. The right 
to  privacy and the  right  to  the  protection  of  personal  data  are  enshrined  in  diverse  national  and 
international laws and regulations, including the Data Protection Convention of the Council of Europe, 
Article 8 of the ECHR, Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and article 8 of the 
Dutch Constitution. There can be no interference with the exercise of the right to private life other than 
in the circumstances described in Article 8, paragraph 2 of the ECHR: 
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right  except  such  as  is  in  accordance  with  the  law  and  is  necessary  in  a 
democratic  society in  the  interests  of  national  security,  public  safety or  the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the  protection  of  health  or  morals,  or  for  the  protection  of  the  rights  and 
freedoms of others. 
In the Netherlands, the most important act of parliament providing for the criteria ‘necessary and in  
accordance with the law’ is the Personal Data Protection Act (WBP).38 This act states that personal 
data may only be gathered for specific purposes. It further prohibits the processing of specific personal 
data, including race, other than for purposes of identification or in response to an application for a  
temporary exemption in order to reverse structural disadvantages among ethnic or cultural minorities  
(sections 16 and 18, Personal Data Protection Act).
 
That information-gathering and data-mining are vulnerable to the risk of ethnic profiling is clear from 
the following example. In 2006, the Data Protection Authority granted a temporary exemption for the 
registration of young Antillean delinquents in 21 municipalities classified as high-risk (section 23, 
35 ENAR (2009),  Factsheet no 40: Ethnic Profiling, Brussels: European Network Against Racism (ENAR); E 
Brouwer  (2008),  Digital  Border  and  Real  Rights:  Effective  Remedies  for  Third-Country  Nationals  in  the  
Schengen Information System. Leiden / Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publications. 
36 A Roessel (2009), ‘Trek Op Die Muur’ (‘Build that wall’),  Groene Amsterdammer, no 42, 14 October 2009; 
B Schermer  and T Wagemans (2009),  ‘Onze Digitale  Schaduw.  Een verkennend onderzoek naar  het  aantal 
databases waarin de gemiddelde Nederlander geregistreerd staat’ (‘Our digital shadow. An exploratory study of 
the number of databases in which the average Dutch person is registered’), Study commissioned by the Data 
Protection Authority, Amsterdam: Considerati, 23 January 2009.
37 National Ombudsman (2008). ‘De Burger in de Ketens: Verslag van de Nationale Ombudsman over 2008’  
(‘Citizens in Chains: Report of the National Ombudsman for 2008’), The Hague: National Ombudsman.
38 The EU Privacy Directive is implemented in the Personal Data Protection Act (WBP), Bulletin of Acts and 
Decrees 2000, 302, 1 September 2001.
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subsection  1(e),  Personal  Data  Protection  Act).39 The  subsequent  bill  to  introduce  an  Antillean 
Reference Index provoked so much public opposition that that government withdrew it. A few years 
later, it should be added, it emerged that the projected figures on the number of Antillean delinquents 
in the Netherlands had been greatly overestimated.40 Instead of adopting an Antillean Reference Index, 
the Dutch Parliament recently passed the Reference Index for At-Risk Youth Act. This Act enables 
care organisations to exchange (through digital channels) personal warnings of risks associated with  
individual young delinquents. One of the risks identified as a possible impediment to a healthy and 
safe  development  to  adulthood  is  that  ‘the  young  person  is  exposed  to  risks  that  occur  with 
disproportionate frequency in specific ethnic groups’ (Section 2 J, part l, Reference Index for At-Risk 
Youth Act).41 So although there is no explicit registration of ethnicity, such distinctions are lurking in 
the  wings.  In  practice,  carers  often  make  notes  (sometimes  in  digital  form)  that  lead  to  ethnic 
registration.42 A motion presented to the Senate of the States General, seeking to postpone the ethnic  
registration of at-risk youth pending a fundamental debate on the desirability of registration of ethnic 
origin in general was rejected.43 This means that the principle of ‘non-registration, unless there are 
objectively justifiable  grounds  for  doing  so’  has  been  abandoned.  In  addition,  such  practices  are  
probably incompatible with the above-mentioned prohibition of non-discrimination and the legislation 
on the protection of personal data.
Police structure and powers
39 The ethnic registration of personal data at the municipal level is prohibited (Section 34, Municipal Database  
(Personal Records) Act of 8 March 2006, Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 9 June 1994, 494). See also Personal  
Data Protection Act. 
40 A  significant  indicator  was  the  number  of  unregistered  Antillean  delinquents  without  a  fixed  place  of 
residence. It later emerged that certain premises were incorrect: for instance, the arrest statistics recorded by the 
Royal Netherlands Marechaussee at Schiphol Airport had been included. See House of Representatives of the 
States General, Actualisatieonderzoek schatting aantal in Nederland verblijvende Antilliaanse Nederlanders die  
niet ingeschreven zijn in de GBA: Een ‘capture-recapture’-analyse in opdracht van het Ministerie van VROM  
(‘Update of the study on the estimate of the number of Dutch nationals of Antillean origin who are not registered  
in the Municipal Personal Records Database: A “capture-recapture” analysis commissioned by the Ministry of 
Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment’), Parliamentary Papers 2009-2010, 26 283, no 53, 30 November 
2009. 
41 Senate / House of Representatives of the States General, Wijziging van de Wet op de jeugdzorg in verband met  
de  introductie  van  een  verwijsindex  om vroegtijdige  en  onderling  afgestemde  verlening  van  hulp,  zorg  of  
bijsturing ten behoeve van jeugdigen die bepaalde risico's lopen te bevorderen (verwijsindex risico's jeugdigen);  
Advies en nader rapport,  (‘Amendment of the Youth Care Act, introducing a reference index to promote the 
timely  and  coordinated  provision  of  assistance,  care  or  guidance  for  certain  at-risk  young  people;  
Recommendations and additional report’) Parliamentary Papers 2008-2009, 31855, no 4, 12 February 2009, p 
12/13;  Data  Protection  Authority,  Besluit  inzake  het  ontheffingsverzoek  Verwijsindex  Antillianen  en  de  
gemeentelijke casusoverleggen Antillianen (‘Decision on request for exemption for an Antillean Reference Index 
and municipal consultations on cases involving Antilleans’) Decision Z2006-00036, 11 December 2006; OCAN 
(2009), ‘Ingezonden Brief. Etnische Registratie: What Works?’ (‘Letter to the editor. Ethnic registration: what  
works?’), Caribbean Dutch Nationals Consultative Body (OCAN), 29 April 2009. 
42C  Prins  (2010),  ‘Discriminatiesignalen’  (‘Signs  of  discrimination’),  NJB  02/10 
http://njblog.nl/2010/01/11/discriminatiesignalen/#more-799 (accessed 5 February 2010).
43 Senate of the States General,  Wijziging van de Wet op de jeugdzorg in verband met de introductie van een  
verwijsindex om vroegtijdige en onderling afgestemde verlening van hulp, zorg of bijsturing ten behoeve van  
risicojongeren  die  bepaalde  risico's  lopen  te  bevorderen  (verwijsindex  risicojongeren);  Motie  om  de  
meldingsgrond 'onevenredige risico's die samenhangen met etniciteit' niet toe te passen , (‘Amendment of the 
Youth Care Act, introducing a reference index to promote the timely and coordinated provision of assistance,  
care or guidance for certain at-risk young people; motion to omit as grounds for registration “disproportionate  
risks related to ethnicity”’), Parliamentary Papers 2009-2010, 31 855, H, 28 January 2010.
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Security  is  safeguarded  in  the  Netherlands  by  the  police,  the  Royal  Netherlands  Marechaussee 
(KMar), intelligence and security services and a number of inspectorates, special investigative services 
(BODs) and supervisory officials with specific tasks and responsibilities. In addition, countless private 
security agents are involved in public tasks such as law enforcement and investigation.
 
The core responsibilities of the police are to maintain public order and to protect the legal order, to  
investigate, provide assistance, and to report warning signals and/or to make recommendations, on the 
basis of the applicable laws and operating under the aegis of the competent authorities (section 2,  
Police Act).  The Netherlands has 25 police regions and a single National Police Services Agency 
(KLPD). The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations bears political responsibility for the  
police, but the regional police service is under the management of the regional board presided over by 
the Regional Police Force Manager − one of the mayors in the region. The rest of the board consists of 
the mayors of the other municipalities and the chief public prosecutor (sections 22, 23, 30 and 31 
Police Act). The Regional Police Force Manager is assisted by the chief of police, who is responsible 
for the executive management of the police. In matters relating to maintaining public order, the police 
operate  under  the authority and decision-making powers  of  the  mayor  of the munipality;  when it 
comes to upholding the legal order on the basis of the criminal law, they operate under the authority of  
the public prosecutor (sections 2, 12 and 13 Police Act; sections 172-175 Municipalities Act; article  
148,  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure).  In  2008  there  were  52,322  police  officers  working  in  the 
Netherlands.44
The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (KMar) is part of the armed forces and therefore operates under  
the  political  responsibility of  the  Minister  of  Defence.  Traditionally,  the  KMar is  responsible  for  
military policing, the control of aliens, border controls at Schiphol Airport, other airports and seaports,  
and providing security for members of the Royal House (section 6, Police Act). It takes part in peace 
missions,  provides  security  for  Dutch  embassies,  and  is  represented  in  the  Netherlands’  overseas 
territories. There is a growing trend, partly in the context of counterterrorism activities, for the KMar 
or other units of the armed forces to be deployed for policing duties.45 In 2008, there were 6,600 
members of the armed forces employed within the KMar in the Netherlands.46
The primary intelligence and security services in the Netherlands are the General Intelligence and 
Security Service (AIVD), the Military  Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD), and the Regional 
Intelligence  Services  of  the  police  force  (RID).  The  AIVD gathers  and supplies  information  and 
personal data on, conducts research on, and prepares threat and risk analyses in relation to, individuals,  
groups and organisations, to help other government bodies to protect national security,47 while the 
MIVD does so for the benefit of the armed forces (sections 6, 6a, 7 and 7a, Intelligence and Security 
Services  Act  2002).  The  AIVD operates  under  the  political  responsibility  of  the  Minister  of  the 
Interior and Kingdom Relations, while the MIVD is answerable to the Minister of Defence. AIVD and 
MIVD officials are not classified as law enforcement officers with investigative powers (section 9,  
44 Annual police report (2008). http://www.jaarverslagpolitie.nl/ (accessed 4 January 2010).
45 L Gunther Moor and CD van der Vijver (2004), ‘Politie en Krijgsmacht’ (‘Police and Armed Forces’) in CJCF 
Fijnaut, ER Muller, U Rosenthal and J van der Torre (2004), Politie: Studies over haar werking en organisatie, 
Deventer: Kluwer, pp 1101-1116 and 1107-1109.
46 Ministry of  Defence  (2010).  Website  Ministry of  Defence  http://www.defensie.nl/marechaussee/personeel/ 
(accessed 4 January 2010).
47 National security includes ‘both security breaches caused by intentional human action (“security”) and threats 
to security caused by disasters, breakdowns in systems or procedures, human error, or natural anomalies such as 
extreme weather conditions (“safety”)’. See National Security Strategy (2007), Council of Ministers, 14 May 
2007. Website of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations http://www.minbzk.nl/@105745/strategie-
nationale (accessed 30 March 2010).
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Intelligence and Security Services Act).  They provide information about possible threats and risks 
relating to state security to other bodies such as the police, which in turn take security measures. Every 
regional police force has a RID, which performs some of its responsibilities for the AIVD (section 60,  
Intelligence and Security Services Act). 
Inspectorates and special investigative services (BODs) operate in specific areas of public enforcement  
(eg  environment,  fiscal  crime  etc)  and  are  accountable  to  line  ministries  (Special  Investigative 
Services  Act,  2006).  For  instance,  the  Fiscal  Information  and  Investigation  Service-Economic 
Investigation Service (‘FIOD-ECD’) falls under the Ministry of Finance and conducts supervisory and 
investigative activities in the financial and economic realm and on goods that enter the Netherlands  
through customs. If public enforcement does not work, it may be appropriate, under certain conditions, 
for BODs to apply the criminal law, with powers deriving from article 141 of the Code of Criminal  
Procedure.
 
Private security companies are hired by the government to perform a variety of ancillary public tasks, 
such  as  guarding  persons  who  have  been  arrested,  supervising  those  in  aliens  detention,  and 
performing  municipal  supervisory  and  enforcement  duties  in  the  public  space.48 Private  security 
officers are also involved in joint public-private activities such as airport and seaport security and 
event safety and security. In some cases, private security officers act as special investigative officers  
(‘BOAs’)  (sections  5 and 11,  Private  Security Organisations  and Detective Agencies  Act).  49 The 
Minister  of  Justice  decides  who is  eligible  to become a  BOA. He or  she also decides  whether a 
particular  BOA can  exercise  certain  police  powers  such  as  stopping  persons,  checking  their  ID,  
security searches, and coercive measures (the power to arrest suspects and take them to the police 
station). In other words, not all BOAs have the same powers (article 447e, Criminal Code; article 142,  
Code of Criminal Procedure; section 3a, Weapons and Munitions Act; Special Investigative Officials 
Act; Police Act; Code of Conduct for the police, the Royal  Netherlands Marechaussee and special 
investigative officials, Weapons and Munitions Regulations). The regional police and the KMar are  
responsible for licensing private security companies and detective agencies, as well as issuing permits 
to  individuals,  and  the  enforcement  and  supervision  of  the  Private  Security  Organisations  and 
Detective  Agencies  Act.  In  2008  there  were  31,000  private  security  officers  working  in  the  
Netherlands, employed by some 250 to 400 commercial companies.50
The  general  and  special  powers  of  the  police,  the  KMar,  the  intelligence  and  security  services,  
inspectorates, BOAs, supervisory officials and private security officers are all different. The following  
sections clarify these powers, inasmuch as they are relevant to the subject of ethnic profiling. In the 
exercise of discretionary powers, investigation or maintaining public order, there is a risk that such 
activities may be carried out (in part) on the basis of generalisations relating to race, ethnicity, religion 
or nationality instead of on the basis of individual behaviour and/or objective evidence. This may be 
expressed directly or indirectly in the decisions of supervisory and/or investigative officials, regarding  
matters such as who they detain for identity checks, interrogation, security searches and sometimes 
48 These activities are based on administrative law.
49 For  more  information,  see  http://www.justitie.nl/onderwerpen/opsporing_en_handhaving/boa/index.aspx 
(accessed 6 January 2010).
50 House of Representatives of the States General, Rechtsstaat en Rechtsorde; Brief Algemene Rekenkamer over  
particuliere beveiliging (‘The rule of law and legal order: Letter from the Netherlands Court of Audit on private 
security companies’), Parliamentary Papers 2009-2010, 29279, no 95, 13 October 2009; T Jones, R van Steden,  
and  H Boutellier  (2009),  ‘Pluralisation  of  Policing  in  England  and  Wales  and  the  Netherlands:  Exploring 
similarity and difference’, Policing and Society, vol 19 , no 3, pp 282-299 at 285.
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arrest.51 It also emerges in relation to special powers such as administrative measures, information-
gathering and data-mining, as well as in surveillance, in high-risk security areas, in border controls, 
and in some parts of government policies on terrorism, radicalisation and aliens.
The powers and responsibilities of the police are based on diverse legislation and regulations. The 
power to perform police duties and hence to breach fundamental rights is based on the principle of  
legality, which means that the actions of all public servants must have a specific statutory basis (article 
15 of the Dutch Constitution; article 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). The Police Act defines the 
tasks of the police, which are further elaborated in the Police Code of Conduct,52 which also applies to 
the KMar and BOAs. The primary task of the police is enforcing the criminal law (under the authority 
of  the  public  prosecutor),  maintaining  public  order  (under  the  authority of  the  mayor),  providing 
assistance,  and enforcing special  Acts of Parliament  (see sections 2,  12 and 13,  Police Act).  The  
Aliens Act is an example of a special Act of Parliament stating that aliens resident in the Netherlands 
are the responsibility of the police. Since it is difficult to regulate all the actions that may be taken by 
police officers, less emphasis is placed on the principle of legality if there is little or no breach of  
human rights.53
Where investigation and maintaining public order are concerned, police officers, and in some cases 
military personnel of the KMar, BOAs and supervisory officials, have a number of specific powers. 
These range from investigative activities such as the identification of individuals to the use of coercive 
measures, including arrest, as regulated by the Code of Criminal Procedure and a number of special 
Acts of Parliament  such as the Weapons and Munitions Act,  the Economic Offences Act and the  
Aliens Act. In practice, police officers possess the discretionary power to exercise their judgment, in a 
reasoned and measured way and in due proportion to the objective at hand, in deciding who to arrest  
or subject to a security search, for instance (section 8, Police Act). Since the parliamentary enquiry 
conducted by the Van Traa Commission in the 1990s, special investigative activities such as phone 
tapping to combat organised crime have been regulated by an amendment to the Code of Criminal 
Procedure introduced  by  the  Special  Investigative  Powers  Act  (articles  126g  to  126ui,  Code  of 
Criminal Procedure).54 The same happened in 2006 in relation to investigations of crimes of terrorism 
with  the  Expansion  of  Scope  for  the  Investigation  and  Prosecution  of  Crimes  of  Terrorism Act 
51 OSI (2009), Ethnic Profiling in the European Union: Pervasive, ineffective and discriminatory, 26 May 2009, 
New York: Open Society Institute, p 10.
52 Police Code of Conduct (1994), Decision of 8 April 1994, containing rules for a new code of conduct for the  
police, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, personnel with specific powers of inspection, and the measures to  
which those deprived of their liberty by law may be subjected.
53 Y Buruma (2004), ‘Formele Bevoegdheden’ (‘Formal powers’), in CJCF Fijnaut, ER Muller, U Rosenthal and 
J van der Torre (2004), Politie: Studies over haar werking en organisatie, Deventer: Kluwer, pp 525-559.
54 For more information, see M Krommendijk, J Terpstra and PH van Kempen (2009),  De Wet BOB: Titels IVa  
en V in de praktijk. Besluitvorming over bijzondere opsporingsbevoegdheden in de aanpak van georganiseerde  
criminaliteit, (‘Decision-making on special investigative powers in the fight against organised crime; Titles IVa 
and V of the Special Investigative Powers Act in Practice’); Research and Documentation Centre (WODC)  / 
Radboud University of Nijmegen, no 1531, The Hague: Boom Legal Publishers.
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(126zao 126zs, Code of Criminal Procedure).55 A bill is currently being prepared to expand the powers 
of the Aliens Police and the KMar to establish the identity and nationality of aliens.56
The following observations apply to the KMar. Besides its general powers, the KMar also possesses a 
number of special powers (section 6, Police Act). Under the Aliens Act, it is responsible inter alia for 
the initial  reception of asylum seekers and the deportation of aliens who have exhausted all  legal 
remedies. In addition, it may assist the police both in maintaining public order and in investigative 
activities. From the treatment meted out to those suspected of drugs smuggling at Schiphol Airport, it  
is clear that the KMar’s methods are not always unchallenged. By way of illustration, since 2003 the 
customs authorities at Schiphol have subjected travellers from certain countries, including Suriname,  
the Netherlands Antilles, Aruba and Venezuela to what are known as 100% checks, that is, a body 
search. After persistent public criticism of both body searches and the treatment of persons suspected 
of drugs smuggling during investigation by the KMar, and a Supreme Court ruling that these selective  
checks can only be performed on persons suspected of an offence and that they constitute breaches of  
human and fundamental rights, this measure was abolished in 2007 (section 17, Customs Act; article 
27, Code of Criminal Procedure; articles 10 and 11 of the Dutch Constitution, and article 8, ECHR ). 57 
The KMar is now somewhat improving its treatment of suspects. A body-scan apparatus is now used 
at Schiphol, enabling those suspected of drug offences to demonstrate their innocence on a voluntary 
basis.  Despite  the  fact  that  demonstrating  one’s  innocence  is  antithetical  to  the  presumption  of 
innocence,  it  is  an  improvement  to  the  previous  practice.  Despite  these  minor  improvements,  it 
remains difficult for the KMar, in the exercise of a substantial proportion of its tasks, not to focus too 
heavily on the nationality or ethnicity of individuals.
The powers of the intelligence and security services are geared towards gathering information relating 
to  national  security.  The  AIVD and  MIVD derive  permission  for  the  use  of  special  powers  for 
information-gathering from the responsible Minister,58 or the chief of the intelligence service, who in 
practice delegates this power in writing to officials operating under his or her authority (section 19, 
Intelligence and Security Services Act).  This means that  special powers such as the power to tap 
telephones and non-cable telecommunications, searches of private places, keeping individuals under 
surveillance  and following them cannot  be  undertaken lightly,  and  can  be  deployed  only for  set  
periods of time (sections 17-33, Intelligence and Security Services Act). The Intelligence and Security 
Services Supervisory  Committee  (‘the  Committee’)  supervises  the  exercise  of  these  powers 
55 B  van  Gestel,  CJ  de  Poot,  RJ  Bokhorst  and  RF  Kouwenberg  (2009),  Signalen  van  Terrorisme  en  de  
Opsporingspraktijk: De Wet opsporing en vervolging terroristische misdrijven twee jaar in werking (‘Indications 
of Terrorism and Investigation in Practice: Two years’ experience with the Crimes of Terrorism Investigation 
and Prosecution Act’); Research and Documentation Centre (WODC), Cahiers 2009-10, no 1880, The Hague: 
Boom Legal Publishers; CJ de Poot, RJ Bokhorst, WH Smeenk and RF Kouwenberg (2008),  De Opsporing 
Verruimd:  De  Wet  opsporing  en  vervolging  terroristische  misdrijven  een  jaar  in  werking,  (‘Scope  for 
Investigation  Expanded:  One year’s  experience  with the Crimes of  Terrorism Investigation  and Prosecution 
Act’), WODC, Cahiers 2008-09, no 1629, The Hague: Boom Legal Publishers / WODC.
56 One of these proposals, for instance, is that if an alien is apprehended in a dwelling that the police has entered  
lawfully, the police may search the dwelling for his ID papers in the course of their investigation to establish 
identity without the alien’s consent (section 53, Aliens Act). See House of Representatives of the States General, 
Letter from the State Secretary for Justice on the expansion of the powers that may be exercised in the control of 
aliens, Parliamentary Papers 2008-2009, 19637, no 1260, 27 March 2009.
57 Judgment  no  (LJN)  AZ8795,  Supreme  Court  ,  01567/06,  29  May 2007;  Art  1  (2007);  Dossier:  100%- 
controles,  Website Art  1  http://www.art1.nl/Article/7752-100-controles_in_het_nieuws; National Ombudsman 
(2006),  Dossier  100%-controles  Schiphol;  Over  bolletjesslikkers  en  onschuldige  slikverdachten,  (‘On  drugs 
swallowers and innocent persons suspected of swallowing’), no 2007/125 2006/230 -001, The Hague: National  
Ombudsman.
58 They are the Ministers of Justice, Defence, and the Interior and Kingdom Relations.
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retrospectively.  For instance, a report issued by the Committee concludes that the AIVD exercises  
restraint in relation to the tapping of telephones and non-cable telecommunication. 59 This is a striking 
conclusion,  since  the  Dutch  justice  department  uses  this  instrument  extremely  often,  certainly in 
comparison with other countries.60 It is hard for members of the public to ascertain how frequently the 
AIVD and MIVD avail themselves of special powers. In general, this information is provided only to 
the  Committee.  In  a  highly unusual  disclosure,  the  fact  was  released  into  the  public  domain,  in  
response to a motion on the floor of the House of Representatives of the States General, that in 2009 
the AIVD had used a total of 1078 taps and MIVD 53.61
Private security work is governed by the Private Security Organisations and Detective Agencies Act  
(WPBR). Where private security officers are deployed for public tasks, additional skills and training 
are required under the terms of this Act, but the actual exercise of such tasks is not governed by the  
WPBR (section 1, subsection 2 (b), WPBR). In such cases, the general laws and regulations apply. For 
instance,  if  private  security  officers  act  as  BOAs,  they  do  so  in  the  framework  of  criminal  law 
enforcement. Private security officers generally support municipal authorities and the police or the 
KMar in specific enforcement  or investigatory duties.62 Examples include municipal  street  patrols, 
youth workers in neighbourhoods where large numbers of young people ‘hang out’ in the streets, and  
security officers at Schiphol Airport.
In principle, the powers of private security personnel such as supervisory officers, BOAs or stewards 
who are deployed for public tasks are the same as those of any member of the public. In practice,  
however, the situation is more complex. Under certain conditions, private security personnel have the  
power to request access to suspects’ names and records of interrogations, to stop and check people,  
and in the event of a misdemeanour, to draw up an official report and/or to impose a minor fine (article 
447e,  Criminal  Code).  In  addition,  the  use  of  force,  breaches  of  physical  integrity,  and  handling 
privacy-sensitive personal information (in aliens detention centres for instance) are not exceptional. 63 
In the context of public-private cooperation, private security officers often derive their extra powers 
from internal rules and conditions of entry, with which passengers or visitors implicitly consent to 
undergo checks on their personal property, body searches, security scans or any other form of control.
59 CTIVD (2009), Toezichtsrapport inzake de toepassing door de AIVD van Artikel 25 WIV 2002 (aftappen) en  
Artikel 27 WIV 2002 (selectie van ongericht ontvangen niet-kabelgebonden telecommunicatie), (‘Supervisory 
report on the application by the AIVD of section 25, Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 (phone taps) 
and section 27, Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 (selection of non-directional interception of non-
cable telecommunication’), no 19, The Hague: Intelligence and Security Services Supervisory Committee.
60 In 2008 a total of 26,425 telephone numbers were tapped by the police, while the corresponding figure in 
Britain was 1,881. See House of Representatives of the States General, Annual Report and Final Account for 
2009 of the Minister of Justice, Parliamentary Papers 2009-2010, 32360 VI, no 1, 19 May 2009, p 56-57; NRC 
Handelsblad (2009), ‘Nederland scoort hoog in tapranglijst’ (‘The Netherlands scores high on phone tapping 
league  table’),  NRC  Handelsblad,  2  September  2009;  United  Nations  Human  Rights  Committee  (2009), 
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: the Netherlands.  CCPR/C/NLD/CO/4, 25 August 
2009, p 4
61 The number of persons concerned is lower, since many have more than one telephone number. See Letter from 
the  Minister  of  the  Interior  and  Kingdom  Relations,  Tapstatistieken  van  de  Algemene  Inlichtingen-  en  
Veiligheidsdienst en de Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (‘Phone tapping statistics of the AIVD and 
MIVD’), no 4334682/01, 19 April 2010.
62 These activities are based on the criminal law. House of Representatives of the States General, Rechtsstaat en  
Rechtsorde; Brief Algemene Rekenkamer over particuliere beveiliging, ‘The rule of law and the legal  order: 
Letter from the Netherlands Court of Audit on private security companies’) Parliamentary Papers 2009-2010, 
29279, no 95, 13 October 2009, pp 2-4.
63 House of Representatives of the States General, Rechtsstaat en Rechtsorde; Brief Algemene Rekenkamer over  
particuliere beveiliging, (‘The rule of law and legal order: Letter from the Netherlands Court of Audit on private  
security companies’), Parliamentary Papers 2009-2010, 29279, no 95, 13 October 2009, p 6.
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Ethnic profiling in practice
Over the past few years, several specific powers have been developed in the areas of maintaining 
public order and criminal law enforcement which, as exercised by police officers, and in some cases 
by BOAs, KMar military personnel or supervisory officials, may have repercussions in the area of  
ethnic profiling. Under pressure from feelings of ‘unsafety’ in the community, nuisance factors, and 
the fight  against  terrorism and crime,  the  government  is  increasingly giving more  priority to  the 
security of the community and less to individual rights. Administrative court orders and decisions by 
administrative bodies such as exclusion orders (forbidding persons from entering a particular area),  
restraining orders (forbidding them from going near a particular person), a requirement to report to the 
police  at  set  times  (meldingsplicht),  compulsory  identification,  preventive  body searches  and  the 
gathering and linking of digital personal details have made checks on people easier and more frequent.  
With these specific powers, local authorities and security services are adopting a strongly preventive, 
problem-oriented  approach.  This  may  have  repercussions  for  the  treatment  of  vulnerable  groups, 
including ethnic minorities and aliens.
ID-checks
In 2005 the legal obligation to carry ID was introduced as a preventive measure, which automatically  
abolished the requirement that no one could be asked to produce ID unless suspected of a specific 
offence. Since then, everyone aged 14 and older has been required to show a valid identity document  
if a police officer, a BOA, or an officer of the KMar deems it necessary in the reasonable exercise of  
his  or  her  duties  (section 1,  Compulsory Identification Act;  section 8a,  subsection 1,  Police  Act; 
section 2, Special Investigative Services Act). This is also compulsory at the request of a supervisory 
official (section 5:16a, General Administrative Law Act).64 Anyone who refuses to comply is guilty of 
a minor offence and may be liable to payment of a fine (article 447e, Criminal Code). During the  
parliamentary debate on the Compulsory Identification Act, the possible discriminatory application of 
this Act was discussed. According to the Minister of Justice, the condition of acting in accordance 
with the ‘reasonable exercise of one’s duties’ constituted a sufficient safeguard.65 
An evaluation has shown that compulsory identification is relatively ineffective as an instrument to 
combat crime, that it was initially applied too widely, and that contrary to what had been feared within  
civil society, there is no evidence of an increase in discrimination.66 It should be noted, however, that 
this latter conclusion was substantiated using information from investigating officers and supervisory 
officials.67 Whether this presents a true picture is therefore open to question, especially given that  
research has shown that minorities such as Muslims, North Africans and Surinamese people in the 
64 Public  Prosecution  Service,  Aanwijzing  uitbreiding  identificatieplicht (‘Directive  on  the  expansion  of 
compulsory identification’), 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2013.
65 House  of  Representatives  of  the  States  General, ‘Amendment  and  supplement  to  the  Compulsory 
Identification Act, the Criminal Code, the General Administrative Law Act, the Police Act 1993 and a number of 
other acts of parliament in relation to the introduction of compulsory identification for members of the public in 
relation  to  officers  appointed  by the police  to  perform police  duties  and  supervisory officials  (Compulsory 
Identification (Extended Scope) Act); List of questions and answers on the scope of the evaluation study to be  
performed by the Research and Documentation Centre (WODC)’. Parliamentary Papers 2004-2005, 29218, no 
23, 10 May 2005. 
66 H Everwijn, W Jongebreur and P Lolkema (2009),  Het Functioneren van de WUID in de Praktijk: Evaluatie  
van de Wet op de uitgebreide identificatieplicht (‘Evaluation of the Functioning of the Compulsory Identification 
(Extended Scope) Act in Practice’) Research and Documentation Centre (WODC), no 1646, Barneveld / The 
Hague: Significant / WODC, pp 43-44 and 148.
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Netherlands,  as  elsewhere  in  Europe,  commonly  do  not  submit  complaints  about  alleged 
discrimination.68 Researchers too draw attention to the risk of prejudice.69 Another consequence of 
compulsory identification is that the increased checks on aliens are impeded by the absence of valid  
identity documents or residence permits (section 9, Aliens Act).70
Preventative searches 
Anyone within a designated ‘security risk zone’ during a set period of time may be subjected to a 
‘preventive search’ by police officers. This instrument was introduced at municipal level in 2002 as an  
additional means of maintaining public order or searching for weapons (section 151b, Municipalities 
Act). These powers are vested in the mayor by means of a by-law,71 which is passed by the municipal 
council after consultations between the mayor and the public prosecutor. When these rules apply, the 
police are empowered, by authority of the public prosecutor, to search any individual as well as goods 
and vehicles, without having any grounds for suspicion (section 14, Police Act, articles 126 zq and 
141, Criminal Code, and section 50(3), 51(3) and 52, Weapons and Munitions Act). Those affected 
have six weeks to submit a written objection and/or request a judicial review of this decision on the 
basis of the General Administrative Law Act. A number of permanent security risk zones have been 
designated by order in council, to facilitate investigations relating to crimes of terrorism:72 the Houses 
of Parliament (Binnenhof), all airports, the train stations of the four major cities, the Media Park in  
Hilversum, and the nuclear power station in Borssele (Investigation of Crimes of Terrorism Decree, 21 
December  2006;  articles  126  zq-zs,  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure).  The  instrument  of  preventive 
searches has serious implications for the presumption of innocence and the right to privacy, and may 
lead to ethnic profiling.
Up  to  a  point,  the  instrument  of  preventive  searches  enjoys  political  and  public  support  in  the 
Netherlands.  The political  debate about  public safety,  and about  preventive searches in particular,  
takes place mainly in the sphere of municipal politics. However, the theme is gradually starting to  
make itself felt in national politics. The People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) and the  
Party for Freedom and Progress (PVV) advocate the expansion or permanent institution of preventive 
searches in the Netherlands, whereas the Green Left Alliance is critical of the instrument. 73 In addition, 
67 It emerges from the interviews that supervisory officials and special investigative officials are often accused of 
discrimination, but that  this is  not  necessarily attributable  to compulsory identification; see H Everwijn,  W 
Jongebreur and P Lolkema (2009), Het Functioneren van de WUID in de Praktijk: Evaluatie van de Wet op de  
uitgebreide  identificatieplicht (‘Evaluation  of  the  Functioning  of  the  Compulsory  Identification  (Extended 
Scope) Act in Practice’), WODC, no 1646, Barneveld / The Hague: Significant / WODC, pp 43-44 and 148.
68 EU Fundamental Rights Agency (2009), European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS), 
Vienna: EU Fundamental Rights Agency, 18 June 2009, pp 50-51.
69 K Meerschaut and P de Hert (2007), Identiteitscontroles in Rechtsvergelijkend Perspectief: Moet controle op  
kleur worden gemeten? (‘Identity checks in the perspective of comparative law. Should checks on colour be 
measured?’) in De orde van de dag, issue 40 December 2007.
70 National  Ombudsman  (2007),  Bewijs  Maar  Wie  je  Bent:  De  afgifte  van  identiteitsdocumenten  (W-2  
documenten)  door  de  Immigratie-  en  Naturalisatiedienst (‘Prove who you  are:  the  issuing of  W-2 identity 
documents by the Immigration and Naturalisation Service’),  no 2007/060, 28 March 2007.
71 Municipal bye-laws lay down the rules that apply to everyone within a municipality. For more information, see 
Bureau  Jansen  and  Jansen  (2010),  Preventief  fouilleren (‘Preventive  searches’), 
http://www.preventieffouilleren.nl/ (accessed 1 February 2010).
72 A government decision to the effect that statutory regulations may be elaborated further.
73 F Teeven (2010), ‘VVD wil Preventief Fouilleren Altijd Toestaan’ (‘VVD wants preventive searches to be 
allowed in all circumstances’), 1 March 2010. VVD website http://www.vvd.nl/actueel/711/vvd-wil-preventief-
fouilleren-altijd-toestaan (accessed 1 April 2010); PVV (2010). De Agenda van Hoop en Optimisme: Een tijd om  
te kiezen, PVV 2010-2015, (‘Agenda of Hope and Optimism: A Time for Choice, PVV 2010-2015, Election 
Programme,  Party  for  Freedom  and  Progress’),  April  2010,  p  13;  Privacy  Barometer  (2010).  Preventief  
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while there is public support for preventive searches, various groups, including many young people, 
consider that the instrument is applied selectively.  It should also be noted that people who live, or 
enjoy the nightlife, in areas where weapons are a relatively serious problem are confronted by such 
searches more than others. For instance, a small majority of persons subjected to such searches in 
Southeast  Amsterdam  (the  Bijlmer  district),74 some  parts  of  which  have  been  designated  almost 
permanently as ‘security risk zones’,  consider it  unfair that such searches are not conducted more  
frequently in other boroughs. In this context it should be noted that research has shown that the vast  
majority of the people who are subjected to preventive searches display sympathy for these actions,  
support  them  up  to  a  point,  and  do  not  experience  them  as  infringements  of  privacy,  but  that  
preventive searches are not a demonstrably effective instrument of investigation and enforcement. 75 
Although  various  evaluations  in  Rotterdam  and  Amsterdam  have  shown  that  results  have  been 
achieved  in  terms  of  the  seizure  of  illicit  weapons,  it  is  questionable whether  these  results  are 
commensurate  with  the  numbers  of  people  checked,  the  number  of  police  hours  or  lower  crime 
figures, including incidents involving weapons.76 It is striking that the local authorities and the police 
are aware, up to a point, of the importance of non-selective searches, and appreciate that how a search 
is conducted influences the way in which people experience it.77 At the same time, it is possible that an 
institutional  form  of  ethnic  profiling  exists,  given  that  preventive  searches  are  conducted  more 
frequently  in  disadvantaged  neighbourhoods  with  high  crime  figures,  whose  populations  include 
relatively large proportions of ethnic minorities and migrants.
Fouilleren (‘Preventive searches’), 2 March 2010, Website Privacy Barometer 2010 (accessed 5 April 2010).
74 Amsterdam-Amstelland  Police  Force  (2010),  Preventief  Fouilleren (‘Preventive  searches’).  Website  of 
Amsterdam-Amstelland  police  force,  http://www.politie-amsterdam-amstelland.nl/get.cfm?id=209 (accessed  5 
April 2010); Municipality of Amsterdam (2010), ‘Beleidsdocumenten Preventief Fouilleren’ (‘Policy documents 
on  the  preventive  search  instrument’),  website  ‘Een  Veilig  Amsterdam’  (‘A  safe  Amsterdam’). 
http://www.eenveiligamsterdam.nl/thema's/thema's/toezicht_handhaving/preventief/beleidsdocumenten 
(accessed 5 March 2010); COT (2006),  Evaluatie Preventief  Fouilleren in Amsterdam: De stand van zaken  
(‘Evaluation  of  the  preventive  search  instrument  in  Amsterdam:  the  present  state  of  affairs’),  The  Hague:  
Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management (COT), p 45.
75 M  Bruinsma (2010),  Evaluatie Preventief  Fouilleren Gemeente Amsterdam (‘Evaluation of the preventive 
search instrument in Amsterdam: the present state of affairs’) Tilburg; Security Accreditation Authority (IVA) 
policy research and advisory report; COT (2009/2003),  Evaluatie Preventief Fouilleren Gemeente Amsterdam  
(‘Evaluation  of  the  preventive  search  instrument  in  Amsterdam:  the  present  state  of  affairs’),  The  Hague: 
Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management (COT); Bureau Jansen and Jansen (2009), ‘Amsterdam: De 
zoveelste  rond  preventief  fouilleren:  knockout’  (‘Preventive  searches  in  Amsterdam,  the  umpteenth  round: 
Knockout’),  website  of  Bureau  Jansen  and  Jansen  http://www.burojansen.nl/Articleen_item.php?id=411 
(accessed on 5 April 2010); E  Muller, L Rogier, H Kummeling, R Dammen, RP Bron, AJT Woltjer and VC 
Kalkhoven  (2008),  Bestuur,  Recht  en  Veiligheid:  Bestuursrechterlijke  bevoegdheden  voor  openbare  
ordehandhaving  en  terrorismebestrijding (‘Administrative  authorities,  law,  and  security:  The  administrative 
court’s powers in maintaining public order and in combating terrorism’), The Hague: Boom Legal Publishers; 
COT (2007), Preventief  Fouilleren in Rotterdam; Maatschappelijk draagvlak, opbrengsten en effecten (‘The 
preventive search instrument in Rotterdam: Public support, results and effects’), The Hague: Institute for Safety,  
Security and Crisis Management (COT); EJ van der Torre and HB Ferwerda (2005), Preventief Fouilleren: Een 
analyse van het proces en de externe effecten in tien gemeenten (‘The preventive search instrument: An analysis 
of the process and the external effect in ten municipalities’), Zeist: Kerkebosch Publishers; MY Bruinsma and H 
Moors (2005),  Illegale Vuurwapens:  Gebruik, bezit en handel in Nederland 2001-2003 (‘Illicit firearms: Use, 
possession and trade in the Netherlands 2001-2003’), Tilburg: Security Accreditation Authority (IVA) policy 
research and advisory report. 
76 A fall in registered crime figures, including those for illegal ownership of weapons or robberies in security risk  
zones, may be attributable to preventive search activities, but this is not necessarily the case. It  is difficult to  
demonstrate a causal relationship. 
77 In practice, a kind of selection has been shown to be more effective from a policing perspective. See EJ van  
der Torre and HB Ferwerda (2005),  Preventief Fouilleren: Een analyse van het proces en de externe effecten in  
tien gemeenten (‘The preventive search instrument: An analysis of the process and the external effect in ten 
municipalities’), Zeist: Kerkebosch Publishers, pp 126-131.
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Administrative powers
Little systematic information is available on the impact of administrative court rulings or measures 
taken  by  administrative  bodies,  but  certain  general  observations  can  be  made.  Measures  such  as  
exclusion and restraining orders and compulsory reporting to the police are seen as extra instruments 
for maintaining public order or the legal order. An exclusion order may be imposed under private or  
administrative law. For instance, someone’s freedom may be curtailed by denying him or her access to 
private or public places for a certain period of time. Local authorities apply such orders inter alia in 
‘travel bans’, which forbid those found guilty of committing a public nuisance from boarding buses,  
trams, trains or metro for a set period of time.78 Private individuals take similar measures, sometimes 
with the cooperation of the police. For instance, shopkeepers may collectively bar someone who has  
displayed undesirable behaviour from entering a shopping or entertainment area. In The Hague city  
centre, such measures were imposed 1671 times in a three-year  period, with 79 individuals being  
prosecuted for trespassing when they failed to keep to the terms of the ban.79
 
Exclusion and restraining orders, and the requirement to report to the police, are also included in the  
Measures for the Prevention of Football Vandalism and Serious Public Nuisance Act,80 and in a Bill 
introducing  National  Security  Administrative  Measures.81 These  two  Bills  create  numerous  new 
preventive powers enabling the authorities to take temporary measures in relation to natural persons to  
combat serious public nuisance or in the interests of national security. Under these new provisions,  
where two conditions are fulfilled (necessity and a person’s behaviour), individuals may be subjected 
by order of the mayor or the public prosecutor (in the case of serious nuisance or football vandalism), 
or by order of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations in consultation with the Minister of 
Justice (where national security is involved), for a limited period of time (up to a maximum of three  
months), to an exclusion or restraining order, or required to report to the police station at set times. In 
addition, licenses, exemptions or authorisations may be denied or revoked. Although national security 
is governed by a divergent regime, those concerned may apply for a judicial review of such a decision 
under the terms of the General Administrative Law Act or appeal the decision before a criminal court  
(see  section 509hh (Code of Criminal  Procedure)  of  the Measures  for the Prevention of  Football  
78 Parool (2010), ‘Boetes en celstraf bij ov-verbod’ (‘Fines and custodial sentences in public transport bans’), 
Parool,  28 May 2010; The Minister  of Transport,  Public Works and Water Management has undertaken to 
amend the Passenger Transport Act 2000 to this end.
79 M Schuilenberg (2009), ‘Verboden Toegang; Onderzoek Gebiedsverboden’ (‘No entrance: A study of orders  
banning persons from entering certain areas (gebiedsverboden)’), NRC Handelsblad, 19 September 2009, p 5.
80 House of Representatives of the States General, ‘Amendment of the Municipalities Act, the Code of Criminal 
Procedure and the Criminal Code regulating the power of the mayor and the power of the public prosecutor to 
take measures to combat football hooliganism, severe public nuisance or serious damaging behaviour in relation 
to persons or goods (measures to combat football hooliganism and serious public nuisance); Motion giving an 
analysis of the range and effectiveness of the current instruments for maintaining public order’, Parliamentary 
Papers 2008-2009, 31467, no 20, 20 March 2009. 
81 Senate of the States General, ‘Rules governing the imposition of restrictive measures on persons with a view 
to protecting national security and governing the refusal to grant or reversal of administrative decisions with a 
view  to  protecting  national  security  (National  Security  Administrative  Measures  Act);  Amended  bill,’ 
Parliamentary Papers 2006-2007, 30556, no. A, 20 March 2007. This Bill has since been held back pending the 
completion of the government’s (additional) evaluation study of the cohesiveness, legitimacy and effectiveness 
or  administrative  and  criminal-law  counterterrorism  measures,  in  response  to  the  findings  of  the  Suyver 
Commission  (Report  of  the  Suyver  Commission  (2009).  Naar  een  Integrale  Evaluatie  van  
Antiterrorismemaatregelen (‘Towards an Integrated Evaluation of Counterterrorism Measures’), Report of the 
Commission for the Evaluation of Counterterrorism Policy, May 2009). See House of Representatives of the 
States  General,  Bijlage;  Rapport  van  de  Commissie  Suyver  Naar  een  integrale  evaluatie  van  
antiterrorismemaatregelen, Parliamentary Papers 2008-2009, 29754, no 164, 17 July 2009.
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Vandalism  and  Serious  Public  Nuisance  Act;  section  4  of  the  National  Security  Administrative 
Measures Bill). Intentional failure to comply with such an order is a criminal offence punishable by a  
term of imprisonment  not  exceeding one year  or a fine (see section 181a (Criminal  Code) of the 
Measures for the Prevention of Football Vandalism and Serious Public Nuisance Act; section 7 of the  
National  Security  Administrative  Measures  Bill).  Administrative  measures  such  as  exclusion  and 
restraining orders and compulsory reporting to the police are infringements of the right to freedom of 
movement.
At local level,  there is scope for other special measures besides those already mentioned, such as  
curfews,  CCTV  surveillance,  bans  on  assembly,  safety  coordinators  and  acceptable  behaviour 
contracts, which are geared towards curbing observed problems such as persistent public nuisance, 
residents feeling ‘unsafe’, and/or high crime figures. It is sometimes suggested that these problems are  
related to poor integration of particular ethnic minorities into Dutch society. Since 2002, Rotterdam 
has  had  safety  coordinators  (stadsmariniers or  ‘urban  marines’),82 who  are  appointed  to  tackle 
persistent safety problems at neighbourhood level.83 
Ethnicity data 
In information-gathering as well as data-mining, personal data are used, processed, shared with other 
agencies and retained by security services. For the police, information-gathering, data-mining and data 
retention are important instruments in investigations and in maintaining public order.84 For them, these 
activities are regulated by the Police Data Act,85 the Police Data Decree, the Act Amending Powers to 
Request Data, a number of articles from the Code of Criminal Procedure, and some sections of the 
Telecom Act and the Economic Offences Act  (articles 125i  to 126 uh and 552a to 592,  Code of  
Criminal Procedure).86 For the AIVD and MIVD the key legislation is the Intelligence and Security 
Services Act (sections 26 to 33). Section 5 of the Police Data Act defines the way in which sensitive  
data including ethnicity must be handled: 
82 These  are  special  officials  who  collaborate  with  the  police,  housing  associations,  tax  authorities,  social  
services,  municipal  health services,  youth care services  and other  institutions in problem neighbourhoods of 
Rotterdam, or in exceptional cases in relation to individuals.
83 PW Tops, B Hoogenboom, W Spijker and E van der Torre, E (2009), Van Urgentie naar Noodzaak: Positie en 
Perspectief  van Stadsmariniers in Rotterdam (‘From Urgency to Necessity:  The Position and Perspective of 
Safety  Coordinators  in  Rotterdam’),  June  2009,  Apeldoorn/  Tilburg:  Website 
http://www.rotterdamveilig.nl/Media/pdf/rapport%20stadsmariniers%202009.pdf (accessed 1 May 2010).
84 R Sietsma (2006),  Gegevensverwerking in het Kader van de Opsporing: Toepassing van Data-mining ten  
behoeve  van  de  Opsporingstaak:  Afweging  tussen  het  opsporingsbelang  en  het  recht  op  privacy  (‘Data 
processing in relation to investigation. Use of data-mining: weighing the interests of an investigation against the 
right  to  privacy’),  Schiedam:  SDU  Publishers;  L  Stevens,  BJ  Koops  and  P  Wiemans  (2004),  ‘Een 
Strafvorderlijke Gegevensvergaring Nieuwe Stijl’ (‘Data gathering new style in the law of criminal procedure’),  
Nederlands  Juristenblad vol  79,  no  32,  pp  1680-1686;  Mevis  Commission  (2001),  Strafvorderlijke 
Gegevensverzameling in de Informatiemaatschappij (‘Data gathering in the law of criminal procedure in the 
information society’) Mevis Commission, no z2001-0735, 18 October 2001, p 5 and p 67.
85 This act replaced the Data Protection (Police Files) Act on 1 January 2008. Under section 43 of the Personal  
Data Protection Act, an exception exists in relation to the principle of specified purpose, since the personal data  
have not been supplied voluntarily.
86 The Telecom Act and the Economic Offences Act were amended in 2009 with the implementation of EU  
Directive 2006/24/EC on the  retention  of  data  generated  or  processed  in  connection  with  the  provision  of 
publicly available electronic  communications services  or  of public  communications networks and amending 
Directive 2002/58/EC (Telecommunications Data Retention Act). See  Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2009, no 
333, 18 July 2005; Act amending the Code of Criminal Procedure and certain other legislation regulating powers 
for requesting data (Powers to Request Data), Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2005, no 390, 6 December 2005.
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Police data relating to a person’s religion or beliefs,  race, political opinions,  
health,  or  sex  life,  as  well  as  personal  information  concerning  trade  union 
membership, shall  be processed solely to supplement the processing of other 
police  data,  and  only  to  the  extent  that  it  is  unavoidable  for  the  objective 
pursued in processing the data.
Under certain specified conditions, information may be supplied on the basis of the Police Data Act to 
BOAs, public prosecutors, mayors, municipal officials, regional police force managers, government 
ministers, intelligence services, foreign investigating officers or third parties (sections 15-17, Police  
Data  Act).  Since  ethnic  registration  is  prohibited  in  the  Netherlands,  bodies  wishing  to  process 
personal data regarding ethnicity must apply for exemption to the Data Protection Authority (section  
23, Personal Data Protection Act; section 34, Municipal Database (Personal Records) Act of 8 March  
2006, Bulletin of Acts and Decrees, 9 June 1994, 494). 
Even so,  police as well  as other government  organisations do in fact  collect  data on the basis of  
ethnicity (although it cannot be traced to individual persons).87 Such data are used inter alia as an aid 
in policy-making. In 2009, for instance, the National Police Services Agency published an analysis of  
the population of ethnically Moroccan offenders in municipalities in the Netherlands, at the request of  
the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.88 This analysis shows, for each municipality, how 
many persons of Moroccan descent had committed at least one crime in 2007, according to police 
records (the numbers recorded those who were suspected of a crime, not those convicted). In addition, 
the municipalities were ranked in order of the seriousness of the problem, based on absolute numbers  
of ethnically Moroccan offenders and the percentage in relation to the total population aged twelve 
and older. The National Police Services Agency compiled this list  by linking police data with the 
Municipal Database. The list was compiled as a tool to facilitate policy-making to tackle this problem;  
it would also be used as a basis for deciding how much extra money should be allocated to specific  
municipalities  to  tackle  crime  and  public  nuisance  among  ethnic  Moroccans.  That  the  use  and 
collecting of such data is vulnerable to over-interpretation is clear from the political and public debate,  
in which there is an ever-growing tendency to posit the existence of a causal relationship between  
ethnicity and disruptive behaviour.
Conclusion
A range  of  political  and  social  developments,  including  the  problem of  terrorism,  radicalisation, 
integration, violent crime, serious public nuisance and public safety, suggests that in the Netherlands 
the genie has been let out of the bottle, so to speak, and that ethnic profiling in political and social  
discourse is no longer seen as a taboo. Although Dutch legislation and regulations do not explicitly  
prohibit  ethnic or racial profiling, for the police, security,  immigration or customs officials to use 
generalisations  based  on  ethnicity,  race,  national  origin  or  religion is  at  odds  with  national  and 
international legislation and regulations.  In principle, individual behaviour and/or objective evidence 
must be the basis for all policy and any action by the government. However, in the climate of the 
current political and public debate, there is no longer an absolute taboo on racial and ethnic profiling.
 
87 Crime figures are collected by the various police forces and passed on to Statistics Netherlands (CBS), which 
keeps records on general police statistics.
88 WAC van Tilburg (2009), Analyse van Marokkaanse daderpopulaties van gemeenten in Nederland (‘Analysis 
of  Moroccan  populations  of  offenders  in  municipalities  in  the  Netherlands’),  Driebergen,  National  Police 
Services Agency, 13 January 2009. 
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It is becoming increasingly common for politicians and administrators to posit a connection between 
ethnicity and criminal or disruptive behaviour. In certain cases there may appear to be some basis for 
this supposition. Thus, some ethnic minorities account for a disproportionate percentage of certain 
registered crime figures. But these disproportionate figures do not have any predictive value for the 
behaviour of any individual  person.  Furthermore,  there is  an element  of the chicken or the egg -  
politicians and administrators may make a connection that misconstrues cause and effect. Such actions 
not  only  ignore  the  presumption  of  innocence  but  international  research  has  shown  that  ethnic  
profiling is not demonstrably effective: it undermines the legitimacy of the government and alienates  
ethnic minorities.89 Nonetheless, it is starting to be accepted that preventive checks on individuals,  
administrative  court  orders,  measures  taken  by  administrative  bodies  and  policy-making  may 
sometimes be based in part on race or ethnicity. 
As a result of the trends outlined above, there is a risk that police, security, immigration and customs 
officials may exercise their general and special powers on the basis of generalisations or stereotypes to 
tackle pressing social problems such as terrorism or serious public nuisance. Even if they do so on the 
basis  of  acts  of  parliament  and regulations,  which  are  in  themselves  largely  neutral  and  possess 
democratic legitimacy, such actions are in breach of national and international standards. 
In principle,  investigative and supervisory officials  use their  general  powers −  including stop and 
check,  security  searches,  arrests,  and  accessing  personal  data  – in  good faith,  in  the  interests  of 
maintaining public order and enforcing the law, but  in some cases,  ethnicity or race plays  a role. 
Certainly when it  comes to the application of special administrative measures such as compulsory 
identification, preventive searches, and the use and linking of digital personal data, it is possible that  
police, security, immigration and customs officials will increasingly come to regard ethnic profiling as 
one way of achieving a higher objective – namely, that of reducing terrorism, radicalisation, crime and 
public nuisance.
89 OSI (2009),  Profiling Minorities: A Study of Stop-and-Search Practices in Paris,  New York: Open Society 
Institute; OSI (2009), Ethnic Profiling in the European Union: Pervasive, Ineffective and Discriminatory, New 
York: Open Society Institute; OSI (2009),  Addressing Ethnic Profiling by the Police: A Report on the Strategies  
for Effective Police Stop and Search Project, New York: Open Society Institute; OSI (2006),  I Can Stop and 
Search Whoever I Want: Ethnic Profiling by Police in Bulgaria, Hungary and Spain, New York: Open Society 
Institute.
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